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Abstract: Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have 
traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis 
that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., 
Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal 
this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the 
cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the 
actual world is always ‘held fixed’ when we go out to nearby possible worlds to assess whether 
the target belief is lucky in a way that is incompatible with knowledge. However, for those 
inclined to replace cognitive internalism with the extended mind thesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 
1998), a very different, ‘active externalist’ version of the cognitive fixedness thesis becomes 
the relevant one for the purposes of assessing a belief’s safety. The aim here will be to develop 
this point in a way that draws out some of the important ramifications it has for how we think 
about safety, luck and knowledge. 
1. Epistemic luck, knowledge and cognitive internalism 
Most all contemporary epistemologists accept the following anti-luck platitude: 
Anti-luck platitude: For all S, p, if S knows a proposition, p, then S’s belief that p is not (in 
some to-be-specified sense) ‘true by luck’. 
Something like the anti-luck platitude was arguably the key take-away lesson from Gettier’s (1963) 
counterexamples, which showed (contra the JTB theory) that a belief could be justified and true, and 
yet, true by luck in a way that seems intuitively incompatible with knowledge1. 
But the platitude needs some sharpening. In what sense, exactly, does knowledge require that a 
belief not be true by luck? We know of some very chancy events that they occurred, and so the anti-
luck platitude must be unpacked in a way that is reconcilable with this fact2. Also, we sometimes 
know things (improbable or not) on the basis of evidence that we could have very easily not have 
come across. The detective who just so happens to catch a piece of very compelling evidence 
blowing in the wind can come to know that a suspect is guilty—even when it was just a matter of 
luck that the evidence was acquired in the first place3. 
According to Duncan Pritchard (2005), the way forward is to model the crux of the anti-luck 
platitude modally, in terms of a safety condition. This strategy, while popular, is not only way to do 
things4. But it’s the strategy I’ll focus on here. Doing so will, I hope, most clearly help to reveal how 
our views about the bounds of cognition can effect our thinking about epistemic luck. 
First though, some quick review. Pritchard’s safety strategy takes as a starting point a modal account of 
lucky events generally speaking5. This account says that if any event is lucky, then it is an event that 
occurs in the actual world but which does not occur in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds 
where the relevant conditions for that event are the same as in the actual world. A fair lottery win 
counts as lucky on the modal account because in a wide class of the nearest possible worlds where 
the initial conditions (i.e., you buy a ticket) are the same as in the actual world, you lose. 
One kind of event is true belief formation. On the modal account, S’s true belief that p is lucky in a 
way that is incompatible with knowledge (what Pritchard calls veritically lucky) if and only if S’s belief 
that p is true in the actual world 𝛼 but false in nearly all nearby possible worlds in which S forms the 
belief in the same manner as in 𝛼6. 
A belief is defined as ‘safe’ when the truth of the belief is not (veritically) lucky in this way–viz. when 
in the nearest possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief about the target proposition in 
the same way as in the actual world, it continues to be true. We can now unpack the anti-luck 
platitude in terms of the notion of safety: if S knows a proposition, p, then S’s belief can’t be ‘true by 
luck’ in the sense that S’s belief that p must be safe; put colloquially, if S knows that p, then S couldn’t 
easily have been incorrect given the relevant way that S in fact forms her belief about whether p. 
So far, so good. But what should count as the relevant way the individual forms the belief in the 
actual world? This matters. It effects what we will end up ‘holding fixed’ about the process 
employed in the actual world, when going out to nearby worlds and assessing whether the belief is 
true. 
According to a rather naive way of thinking about this, the way you form a belief in the actual world, 
for the purposes of assessing the safety of a belief, is just a matter of whatever evidence for that 
belief you have in your possession in the actual world7. On reflection, though, this is not enough to 
hold fixed when looking out to other worlds. After all, the mental processes that one deploys in 
evaluating one’s evidence could vary in reliability (perhaps dramatically8) across cases where the 
evidence one has remains exactly same. Accordingly, if on the safety account we don’t at least hold 
fixed the mental processes one employs in the actual world in forming her belief, when moving out 
to possible worlds, we’d would no way of accounting for why (for example), for two individuals who 
have the same evidence, the person who haphazardly evaluates that evidence but luckily draws the 
right conclusion fails to know, while the person who reads the evidence unimpeachably and draws 
the right conclusion does not. 
The foregoing suggests a plausible corollary to a safety condition on knowledge—call it the cognitive 
fixedness thesis. 
Cognitive fixedness thesis: For all S, p, and cognitive process 𝜙, if 𝜙 is a cognitive process 
that S employs in the actual world in forming her p-belief, then, in evaluating the safety of 
S’s p-belief, 𝜙 must be held fixed when we go out to near-by possible worlds to assess 
whether S’s p-belief remains true. 
For example, in the following diagram, suppose AW is the actual world, and let A, B, C, and D be 
close nearby worlds to the actual world AW. Cognitive fixedness tells us that if an individual S at 
AW employs a cognitive process (CP) in her belief that p in AW, then when we look to A, B, C and 
D to assess whether S’s belief remains true in these nearby worlds, we must also suppose that CP is 
the cognitive process that S employs in A, B, C and D, rather than any other cognitive process. 
 
Crucially, without cognitive fixedness assumed to be in play, the safety account would be open to 
allowing cases where the cognitive process that’s actually used by an agent in forming the target belief 
is treated as not part of the relevant way she forms her belief in the actual world, and consequently, 
the account would end up generate implausible results—e.g., that whether one was drunk when 
drawing an inference could potentially not matter for determining whether her belief is safe. 
Interestingly, there are potentially conflicting ways to interpret the cognitive fixedness thesis, 
depending on how we think about what actually counts as the cognitive process one employs. The 
received view on this matter, cognitive internalism (e.g., Adams and Aizawa 2001; 2008; 2010) says the 
following: 
Cognitive internalism: An individual’s mind is (in short) in her head; cognitive processes 
(e.g., memory, inference, introspection, etc.) are exclusively intracranial processes, which play 
out inside the head. 
The cognitive fixedness thesis, paired with a background commitment to cognitive internalism, gives 
us a more explicit version of the cognitive fixedness thesis, according to which: 
Cognitive fixedness thesis (internalism): For all S, p, and intracranial cognitive process 𝜙𝐼, if 
𝜙𝐼 is a cognitive process that S employs in the actual world in forming her p-belief, then, in 
evaluating the safety of S’s p-belief, 𝜙𝐼 must be held fixed when we go out to near-by 
possible worlds to assess whether S’s p-belief remains true. 
Cognitive internalism, however, has become increasingly controversial in recent philosophy of mind 
and cognitive science9. In the next section, I will briefly sketch a more inclusive picture of a 
cognitive process—one that owes in a large part to work by Clark and Chalmers (1998)—and on 
this basis, consider an ‘extended mind friendly’ interpretation of the cognitive fixedness thesis and 
show how this thesis interfaces in surprising ways with knowledge, luck and safety. 
2. Safety, cognitive fixedness and active externalism 
Consider at this point the following case, due to Clark and Chalmers (1998): 
Otto suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, and like many Alzheimer’s patients, he relies on 
information in the environment to help structure his life. Otto carries a notebook around 
with him everywhere he goes. When he learns new information, he writes it down. When he 
needs some old information, he looks it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually 
played by a biological memory. 
Upon considering such a case, one might be inclined to think something along the following lines: 
‘It’s almost as if Otto’s memory is in his notebook, not his head!’ After all, Otto in the above case is 
using the notebook to store and retrieve information, which is what we ordinarily use our 
biomemory to do. 
What proponents of the extended mind thesis insist is that Otto’s memory really is outside his 
head—literally—viz., that his memory process criss-crosses the boundaries between Otto’s brain and 
the the world, so as to include the notebook as part of the memory process. As Clark and Chalmers 
put it, in terms of a parity insight: 
Parity Principle: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the 
cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. (Clark & 
Chalmers 1998: 8) 
Clark and Chalmers’ rationale for this inclusive way of thinking about what to include as part of a 
cognitive process is aimed at safeguarding against bioprejudice—viz., giving undue consideration to 
things like material constitution and location when delineating cognitive processes. As they put it: 
[…][T]he notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga; the 
information in the notebook functions just like the information [stored in Inga’s biological 
memory] constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information 
lies beyond the skin10 (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 13). 
As Clark and Chalmers appraise the situation, Otto’s memory process is a transcranial process that 
includes his notebook; and furthermore, Otto’s memories are stored in his notebook no less than 
our memories are stored in biomemory. And just as, in ordinary circumstances, we are credited with 
non-occurrent beliefs in virtue of information that is stored in biomemory, Otto is credited with 
non-occurrent beliefs in virtue of information that is stored in his extended memory, i.e., the 
notebook. In this respect, Otto’s mind is literally extended; it supervenes on parts of the world 
outside his skin and skull. 
Clark and Chalmers’ embracing of the extended mind is of course at tension with cognitive 
internalism. Call the denial of cognitive internalism cognitive externalism—viz., the denial of the claim 
that (in short) necessarily, cognitive processes have intracranial material realisers. Clark and 
Chalmers’ extended mind thesis entails cognitive externalism, though this entailment is 
asymmetrical11. 
For our purposes, what matters presently is this: if we think about what literally counts as part of a 
cognitive process in an externalist rather than an internalist fashion, then the familiar internalist 
unpacking of the cognitive fixedness thesis is no longer viable. Rather, what will be needed is an 
externalist gloss of the cognitive fixedness thesis, according to which: 
Cognitive fixedness thesis (externalism): For all S, p, and transcranial cognitive process 𝜙𝑇, if 
𝜙𝑇 is a cognitive process that S employs in the actual world in forming her p-belief, then, in 
evaluating the safety of S’s p-belief, 𝜙𝑇 must be held fixed when we go out to near-by 
possible worlds to assess whether S’s p-belief remains true. 
To get a feel for how the externalist cognitive fixedness thesis will have a bearing on which beliefs 
count as safe, consider the following variation on Clark and Chalmers’ case of Otto, due to Carter 
(2013): 
Notebook Jokester: Otto consults his notebook to determine when his doctor’s appointment 
was today, and finds the correct time, noon, written in the book. Unbeknownst to Otto, his 
notebook had been stolen by a jokester, who fudged with the times of Otto’s other 
appointments that day, changing them all back an hour. The jokester, however, overlooked 
the doctor’s appointment, leaving the original and correct time intact12. 
Against a background commitment to cognitive internalism, the state and qualities of Otto’s 
notebook (e.g., what is written in the book, whether certain pages are missing) are the sort of thing 
that could vary across possible worlds along with other aspects of Otto’s environment. After all, by 
the internalist cognitive fixedness thesis, what we are obligated to hold fixed across worlds is just the 
intracranial cognitive process Otto employs in the actual world, a process that does not include the 
qualities of the notebook he consults. The safety theorist operating with an internalist fixedness 
principle accordingly can allow that in some near-by worlds, the jokester changes the entry in Otto’s 
notebook that corresponds with his doctor’s appointment. And this, indeed, seems like a prima facie 
good outcome. After all, by supposing that in some near-by worlds the jokester changes the date of 
doctor’s appointment (rather than overlooking just this one entry) we can straightforwardly account 
for the strong intuition in Notebook Jokester that the unsafety of Otto’s belief undermines his 
knowledge; his belief could easily have been incorrect because the jokester could easily have tinkered 
with, rather than left alone, the doctor’s appointment entry. 
Things are interestingly different in Notebook Jokester for the ‘extended mind’ safety theorist who 
operates with a Clark/Chalmers-style externalist rather than internalist cognitive fixedness principle. 
Because the state of Otto’s notebook is literally the state of Otto’s memory, given the extended 
mind thesis, the state of Otto’s notebook must be exported to all possible worlds, when—in 
evaluating the safety of Otto’s belief—we assess whether his target belief remains true in these 
worlds. 
But once this point is appreciated, a strange result materialises. Since by stipulation the jokester 
leaves intact Otto’s correct entry specifying his doctor’s appointment, the correct entry for the doctor’s 
appointment is (as part of the state of the notebook, viz., the state of Otto’s memory) itself exported 
to all worlds for the purposes of evaluating the safety of the target belief in the actual world. But this 
means Otto’s belief in the actual world is safe! After all, in the nearest worlds (i.e., in the diagram 
below, A, B, C, and D) where Otto (O) consults his notebook as he does in the actual world, he is 
consulting a notebook (NB) with the correct time written for his doctor’s appointment. And those are 
worlds where Otto believes truly the time of his appointment—viz., he looks right at the correct 
entry.13. 
 
 
I noted that this is a strange result because Otto’s belief is obviously unsafe—structurally very similar 
to a barn facade case. Ex hypothesi, in Notebook Jokester, the jokester really could have easily tinkered 
with the entry for Otto’s doctor’s appointment just as the jokester did with the other entries in the 
notebook, which would have led Otto to believe incorrectly what time the doctor’s appointment 
was. And yet, with the externalist cognitive fixedness principle in play, the safety theorist seems 
forced into the awkward position of saying otherwise. As with any puzzle, something has to be 
rejected, but it’s not clear what. To appreciate why, consider three potential salient options and their 
respective drawbacks: 
Option 1. Reject the extended mind thesis. Rationale: Otto’s belief is clearly unsafe. But, since 
safety theorists who embrace EMT should accept the extended cognitive fixedness principle, 
and this principle generates the results that Otto’s belief is not unsafe, the extended mind 
thesis should go. A drawback is that this will plausibly be the last option that one already 
friendly to the extended mind thesis would be inclined to pursue. But more importantly, this 
route seems to sidestep rather than really engage with the puzzle. 
Option 2. Reject that EMT proponents should embrace the externalist cognitive fixedness principle. 
Rationale: this allows one to hold on to the extended mind thesis while at the same time 
avoiding the impalatable result that Otto’s belief is safe. A drawback, though, is that it would 
be unprincipled at best for the safety theorist who embraces EMT to advert to the internalist 
version of the cognitive fixedness principle just to achieve the result that that Otto’s belief 
comes out unsafe. After all, the internalist version of the cognitive fixedness thesis simply 
makes explicit that what should be held fixed (when evaluating for safety) under the 
description of a ‘cognitive process’ are exclusively intracranial cognitive processes. But 
embracing this line, for the EMT theorist, is tantamount to purporting to embrace a position 
while theorising in a way that suggests otherwise. 
Option 3. Deny that Otto’s belief in Notebook Jokester is unsafe. Rationale: like Option 1, this is a 
quick way out of the puzzle. However, this line is really a nonstarter; at least, to pursue this 
line, one would need to defend the position that Otto couldn’t easily have been wrong, given 
the relevant way he formed the belief, while maintaining that (for example) in paradigmatic 
instances of unsafe belief which seem closely structurally similar—viz., barn facade cases—
the protagonists have unsafe beliefs. 
3. ‘Extended’ epistemic luck: new philosophical problems 
In this section, I want to suggest why cases like Notebook Jokester raise some additional perplexities 
for traditional thinking about knowledge, luck and safety, beyond the puzzle sketched in §2. In 
particular, in §3.1, I’ll show how such ‘extended luck’ challenge the familiar 
intervening/environmental luck distinction; in §3.2 I raise and reply to an objection to the epistemic 
significance of such cases as raised in recent work by Benjamin Jarvis (2015), and in §2.3, I close by 
outlining a further kind of problem brought about by the interfacing of epistemic luck and the 
extended mind, which I call the retroindication problem. 
3.1 Taxonomising epistemic luck 
In the mainstream literature on epistemic luck, there is a distinction due to Pritchard (2005) between 
two kinds of knowledge-undermining (i.e., veritic) epistemic luck: intervening and environmental. This 
distinction is useful in marking two structurally different kinds of Gettier cases14. ‘Intervening luck’ 
undermines knowledge when the unsafety of the target belief is due to luck intervening ‘between the 
agent and the fact’ in a way that is not present in cases where the unsafety of a target belief is simply 
a matter of her being in an environment where she easily could have been mistaken. For example, in 
Gettier’s (1963) famous original cases, there is a disconnect between the justification the agent has 
for the target belief and what causes the belief to be true, a disconnect that is then regained by luck15. 
By contrast, in barn-facade-style cases (e.g., Ginet 1975; Goldman 1976), the unsafety of the target 
belief does not owe to any such disconnect. For instance, in Ginet’s (1975) original case, nothing 
goes ostensibly awry. The hero in question forms a perceptually grounded belief that there is a barn 
in front of him, having looked directly at a genuine barn. The source of the unsafety of the belief is 
just down to the individual being in the environment she is in, one in which she is surrounded by 
fakes. In nearby worlds, she looks at a fake rather than a real barn and believes falsely. 
Question: in Notebook Jokester, is the truth of Otto’s unsafe belief about his doctor’s appointment a 
matter of intervening or environmental luck? As it turns out, neither answer is wholly satisfying. 
In one respect, the answer seems to be environmental. Consider that in the barn facade case—the 
paradigmatic environmental luck case—the hero looks at an actual barn in a circumstance under 
which he easily could have looked at a fake and believed falsely. And Otto’s situation in Notebook 
Jokester is arguably very similar. Because the jokester overlooks Otto’s doctor’s appointment belief, 
leaving it intact and accurate, this particular piece of information is much like the ‘real barn’ in the 
barn facade case—viz., with some abstraction: one looks to something accurate which is surrounded 
by what is inaccurate and which one easily could have looked to. The setback, however, with this 
diagnosis, is this: while the safety theorist adverting to a cognitive internalist cognitive fixedness 
thesis can unproblematically help herself to it, the proponent of EMT can not. After all, if you are 
an EMT theorist, it’s hard to see why Otto should be described as in a bad environment. Unlike barns, 
the entries in his notebook—no matter what their state—are internal to his cognitive life. 
The alternative of course is to think of the case instead as one where the unsafety of Otto’s belief is 
more akin to a case of intervening luck. However, this description is problematic as well; it’s not the 
case that there is a disconnect between the justification the agent has for the target belief and what 
causes the belief to be true, as is characteristic of intervening luck cases. In this respect, unsafe 
beliefs, in extended mind cases, would appear to require some kind of modification for a taxonomy 
of kinds of knowledge-undermining luck proposed initially against a tacit commitment to cognitive 
internalism. 
3.2 Jarvis’s (2015) bio-jokester 
Consider the following ‘bio-twist’ on Notebook Jokester, due to Benjamin Jarvis (2015, 468): 
Bio-Jokester: Otto* (without Alzheimer’s) has a normally functioning biological memory, 
which he consults to determine when his doctor’s appointment was today, and ends the 
correct time, noon, is what he (at least seems) to remember. Unbeknownst to Otto*, his 
memory has been systematically altered by a jokester, who used pharmaceuticals and 
subliminal suggestion to plant false memories about his other appointments that day, making 
Otto* inclined to believe that they are an hour earlier than he used to believe. The jokester, 
however, overlooked the doctor’s appointment, leaving the original and correct time 
registered in Otto*’s memory. 
With reference to this creative ‘intracranial twist’ on the case, Jarvis casts doubt on whether cases 
like Notebok Jokester point to any special epistemological significance of extended mind cases, per se. 
In particular, Jarvis questions whether the fact that Notebook Jokester is an extended mind case is itself 
relevant either to the kind of puzzle proposed at the end of §2 or to the taxonomical problem 
concerning environemntal and intervening luck canvassed §3.1. He reasons, with reference to his 
above Bio-Jokester case, that cases that do not feature radically extended cognition (i.e., by the lights 
of the extended mind thesis) should generate the same kinds of epistemological issues. This is 
because Jarvis says that he doesn’t see ‘any reason to think that there should be a difference in 
verdict between JOKESTER and BIO-JOKESTER’ (2015, 468). 
While I am sympathetic to some extent with Jarvis’ worry, I want to explain why I think the thrust 
of the worry can be resisted. Let me now be clear about what I grant and do not grant. I grant that 
that Jarvis’s case appears to have as much import as Notebook Jokester does for our theorising about 
the environmental/intervening distinction, as per §3.1. In short, and for reasons that mirror what 
was noted about Notebook Jokester, if the target belief is unsafe, in Jarvis’s Bio-Jokester case, it does not 
fit neatly in either the environmental nor the intervening category. This is, I think, additional 
evidence for supposing that views that advert to this distinction (for instance, as it plays an 
important role in recent debates about knowledge-how and understanding16) will need to clarify 
exactly how it is to be drawn. 
However, I want to now pose a dilemma to Jarvis’s diagnosis of Bio-Jokester. The dilemma, in short, 
is this: Firstly, there is reason to reject Jarvis’s conclusion that the cases are in fact epistemically 
symmetrical, because there are reasons to suppose that Otto’s belief in Notebook Jokester is unsafe 
(this was, to be clear, something that I argued that the EMT theorist who adverts to an externalist 
fixedness principle can’t account for) where as Otto*’s belief in Bio-Jokester is (despite initial 
appearances) very plausibly actually safe. However—and here is the crux of the dilemma—if one 
were to adjust the details of the Bio-Jokester case so as to control for this epistemic difference, then 
Bio-Jokester comes apart from Notebook Jokester in a diferent epistemic respect—viz., it will (more so 
than Noteook Jokewster) be plausibly diagnosed as a case of an unsafe belief due to intervening luck. 
In order to defend this dilemma, it’s important to see why, despite initial appearances, Otto*’s belief 
in Bio-Jokester is plausibly actually safe and in this respect differs from Notebook Jokester, whose belief 
ought to be diagnosed as unsafe. Consider that Otto*’s belief in his doctor’s appointment in Bio-
Jokester is unsafe only if Otto really would (given the description of his belief forming in the actual 
world) believe falsely in nearby worlds. But it’s this point that is dubious in a way that it’s not in 
Notebook Jokester. Remember that, in Bio-Jokester, it is a feature of the case that Otto* is storing the 
information relevant to organising his life in biomemory. Operating under the assumption that 
Otto*  is appropriately epistemically vigilant, he will—like other individuals in normal 
circumstances—rely on metacognitive virtues (see, for instance, Morton 2004; Sosa 2015), in light of 
which Otto will be sensitive to certain kinds of abberations and incoherences. For instance, we can 
assume that in the default case, if Otto* attempts to retrieve one of the memories that was altered by 
pharmaceuticals and subliminal suggestion, he will be (upon locating the memory) be sensitive to 
how this fails to cohere with his other beliefs; normally functioning metacognitive faculties will 
plausibly ‘flag’ such beliefs, so that the individual does not simply automatically endorse it. This fact 
militates against the ‘unsafety’ verdict for the doctor’s appointment belief in Bio-Jokester; even if 
Otto*’s doctor’s appointment belief is affected by the jokester in near-by worlds, it’s not clear that 
(with properly functioning metacognitive virtues) in thoser worlds if Otto ∗ retrieved that entry, he 
would actually endorse its content, and thereby, believe falsely. Whereas, the same is not the case in 
Notebook Jokester, where, if the content of the doctor’s appointment entry was altered by a jokester, 
it’s hard to see how Otto would be in any position to flag this in a relevantly analogous way that 
would prevent him from automatically endorsing its content. 
Of course—and here is the rest of the dilemma—one might suppose this disanalogy could be 
controlled for. Simply revise the case of Bio-Jokester so that the pharmaceuticals and subliminal 
inception have further deleterious effects on Otto*’s memory—viz., effects that undermine not just 
some of his diary entries. Rather, we could suppose the pharmaceuticals and subliminal messages 
disable his meta-cognitive virtues so that Otto* is in no position anymore to spot incoherences 
between the beliefs which are tampered with by the jokester and other beliefs he holds. 
This move attains the result that Otto*’s belief in Bio-Jokester will be unsafe. But it gets this result at 
the cost of raising a further disanology: as soon as we revise Bio-Jokester in the fashion just described, 
Bio-Jokester (unlike Notebook Jokester) begins to look like a pretty clear case of intervening epistemic 
luck. Otto* after all would be using a now-thoroughly defective cognitive process, one riddled pretty 
comprehensively with pharmaceuticals and sublimation, which happens to issue a true belief on a 
particular occasion. In light of this dilemma, I think Notebook Jokester continues to raise philosophical 
problems for the safety theorist which can’t so easily be mimicked by intracranial analogue cases. 
3.2 Luck, fixedness and the retroindication problem 
I want to now briefly sketch as final philosophical issue relevant to anti-luck epistemology—what I 
call the retroindication problem—which is uniquely raised by extended luck cases. The details of the 
retroindication problem might be easiest to appreciate by running a ‘high-tech’ variation on Notebook 
Jokester; call this ‘Glitchy iCloud’: 
Glitchy iCloud: Otto** consults his iPhone’s Apple Calendar to determine when his doctor’s 
appointment was today, and finds the correct time, noon, written in the the online diary. 
Unbeknownst to Otto**, an iCloud glitch has affected all of Otto**’s Apple Calendar 
entries; however, a further glitch which counteracts the original glitch prevents the original 
glitch from tampering with just the doctor’s appointment entry. 
Provided Otto’s notebook is part of his extended cognitive process in Notebook Jokester, so is 
Otto**’s iPhone in Glitchy iCloud—and indeed, high-tech formulations of Otto are standard fare in 
the extended cognition literature17. With reference to the extended cognitive fixedness principle, 
which safety theorists inclined to the extended mind thesis should embrace, the extended cognitive 
process which Otto** employs in the actual world—viz., a process that includes the iPhone—must 
be held fixed in all worlds when we assess whether Otto**’s belief continues to be true. The 
retroindication problem is that, even if we hold this fixed, certain other things could happen in such 
worlds which, if these things were to happen, they would cause Otto**’s relationship with the 
iPhone to no longer count as an extended cognitive process anymore, by the lights of extended cognition, thus 
retroindicating that the process that includes the iPhone should not be held fixed in such worlds. 
This is a problem for evaluating safety that is unique to extended mind cases. 
To make the retroindication problem more concrete, just add some further detail to Glitchy iCloud. 
Conider that, for the purpose of evaluating the safety of Otto**’s belief in the actual (Glitchy iCloud) 
world, some worlds will be worlds where the following is true: the glitch (which we hold fixed, as is, 
as part of the state of Otto**’s mind) will cause a media campaign against Apple, one which has as a 
consequence that Otto**  (in such worlds) is constantly exposed to news stories and testimony 
according to which he is told not to trust any information on an Apple device. In such worlds, 
Otto** subjects all entries on his iPhone calendar to intense critical scrutiny and does not 
automatically endorse the information stored in the calendar. 
But in worlds where Otto** fundamentally mistrusts his iPhone, Otto**’s interaction with the it no 
longer qualifies (at least, by Clark’s light’s) as an extended cognitive process; Otto** will be, in short, 
not relying on the device anymore in a way that is analogous to the way we rely on biomemory in the 
intracranial case. But if this is right, then it retroindicates that Otto**’s extended process (from the 
actual world) should not (and contrary to the externalist cognitive fixedness thesis) be assumed to be 
the cognitive process that he employs at such worlds; the entries in the online calendar, in such 
worlds, are no longer part of a cognitive process. 
The retroindication problem, thus, calls into question the coherence of maintaining the externalist 
cognitive fixedness principle, by revealing how what counts (by the lights of EMT) as an extended 
cognitive process in the actual world may not be exportable to all worlds as an extended cognitive 
process. This is a further issue, generated by extended mind cases, that I think deserves attention by 
philosophers interested in the anti-luck ramifications of radically extended cognition. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The connections between the extended mind thesis, in the philosophy of mind and cognitive 
science, and mainstream epistemology, are still in early days18. Here my aim has been to raise what I 
think are some of the more interesting philosophical issues the extended mind thesis poses for the 
specific area of epistemology concerned with the relationship between knowledge and luck. I’ve 
argued that on at least one natural way of thinking about this relationship, in terms of safety, the 
extended mind thesis generates some new perplexities. In particular, I’ve argued that EMT 
proponents ought to, when assessing the safety of a target belief, embrace a version of the cognitive 
fixedness thesis that comports with the EMT conception of what should be held fixed under the 
description of a cognitive process in the actual world. 
However, I’ve shown that once a suitably ‘externalist’ fixedness principle is in play, it’s hard to 
maintain intuitive judgments about safety, and furthermore, it becomes less clear how we should 
distinguish between environmental and intervening epistemic luck, a distinction that is much more 
straightforward in cases where what’s fixed under the description of a cognitive process is the 
intracranial cognitive process employed in the actual world. I’ve considered and responded to some 
challenges to the significance of the kind of puzzles I’ve raised, and I concluded by raising yet 
another problem—the retroindication problem—which I think extended-mind-friendly safety 
theorists must grapple with. I have not attempted to solve the problems I’ve raised here. I am, as of 
yet, not convinced what the right way forward will be to address them. My more modest aim is to 
show that extended mind cases have important and interesting import for how we theorise about 
knowledge and luck, and to make explicit where some of these points of interest lie. 
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NOTES 
 
1 For discussion on this point, see Church (2013), Pritchard (2015a), Carter and Broncano-Berrocal (2017, sec. 1), 
and Broncano-Berrocal (2016, sec. 1c). 
2 Consider one very liberal reading of ‘true by luck’: S’s belief that p is true by luck iff it’s a matter of luck that p is 
true. The anti-luck platitude, unpacked in this way, says that if S knows a proposition, then it is not it’s a matter of 
luck that p is true. But this is obviously false given that we know all sorts of improbable propositions. Let p be the 
proposition I was just dealt a royal flush in Texas Hold ’Em poker! Suppose p is true, and thus that you were dealt a hand 
of cards the probability of which your being dealt was just 0.0032%, a frequency of 1 in 4,324 hands. After the 
cards are all dealt and the royal flush sits clearly on the table, you obviously know it’s a royal flush. It’s improbability 
or disconnection from your skill is by the by. 
3 See here Engel (1992, 66–72), Pritchard (2005, 136) and Greco (2004, 398). 
4 The modal account is not uncontroversial. For example, according to the lack-of-control account of luck, an 
event is lucky for a given agent just when it is significantly enough beyond that agent’s control (see, for example, 
Broncano-Berrocal 2015; Coffmann 2007; Riggs 2009; Zimmerman 1987). While the modal account will be helpful 
for illustrative purposes, in light of the points that will be made here about the cognitive internalism and the 
extended mind thesis, similar conclusions to those I’ll draw in §3 could be reframed in terms of the lack-of-control 
account of luck. For some recent scepticism about either of these accounts of luck, see Lackey (2008) and Hales 
(2014). 
5 E.g., Pritchard (2014). For a recent modification of this account in light of some objections raised to previous 
formulations, see Carter and Peterson (forthcoming). See also (Pritchard 2015b; Forthcoming) for presentations of 
Pritchard’s recent transition from anti-luck epistemology to anti-risk epistemology. 
6 See also Pritchard (2013). 
7 For a more detailed discussion of evidence and luck, in connection with the propositional/doxastic justification 
distinction, see Bondy and Pritchard (forthcoming). 
8 Sherlock, for example, could evaluate evidence against Moriarty in normal conditions, or he could evaluate this 
evidence while under the influence of crystal DNT, a drug that causes generally reliable but believable 
hallucinations. If the hallucination-infused evaluation of the evidence led Sherlock to believe Moriarty was guilty, 
then (unlike in the normal good case) Sherlock would be in no better a position, epistemically, than the Duke of 
Devonshire who, in a case noted by Moore (1993, 189), ‘once dreamt that he was speaking in the House of Lords 
and, when he woke up, found that he was speaking in the House of Lords’. 
9 For a sample of some recent challenges to cognitive internalism, see for example Clark and Chalmers (1998), 
Clark (2008), Sutton (2010), Hutchins (1995), Palermos (2011), Menary (2006) and Wilson (2000). 
10 Clark (2008) grants that, just as in the case of ordinary biological memory, the availability and portability of the 
resource of information should be crucial (see for discussion also Carter, Gordon, and Palermos 2015). 
Accordingly, Clark provides a set of functionalist criteria that must be satisfied by non-biological candidates for 
inclusion into an individual’s mind: 1) ‘That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked’. 2) ‘That any 
information thus retrieved be more-or-less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical 
scrutiny […] It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory’. 3) 
‘That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required’ Clark (2008, 46). 
11 Not all strategies of resisting cognitive internalism involve endorsing the full extended mind thesis. For example, 
the embedded cognition thesis is arguably more conservative than the extended mind thesis while nonetheless 
parting ways with cognitive internalism. For a taxonomy of various varieties of cognitive (and epistemic) 
externalism and their relationship to one another, see Carter et al. (2014). 
12 Note that we can abstract from this case to form a kind of recipe for generating similar cases, including ‘high 
tech’ versions of the case. For instance, just suppose Otto is storing his information not in a notebook but in his 
Apple Calendar on his iPhone; further, suppose a computer glitch affects all of his entries but, due to a further 
glitch which counteracts the original glitch, prevents the original glitch from tampering with the doctor’s 
appointment entry. I consider a case of this sort in §3.3. 
13 After all, in most worlds where Otto consults his notebook, replete with the correct entry, he believes truly. This 
much is part and parcel with the thought that Otto is simply a vigilant user of his notebook (as is necessary to meet 
 
 
 
Clark’s glue and trust conditions—see for example Pritchard (2010)), one who by stipulation is using his notebook 
in a way that is analogous to the way we store and retrieve information in biomemory. 
14 See, for example, Pritchard (2015a), Carter and Broncano-Berrocal (2017, sec. 1), and Broncano-Berrocal (2016, 
sec. 1c). The distinction has theoretical importance in debates about understanding and knowledge-how, standings 
which have been argued to be compatible with environmental but not epistemic luck, unlike propositional 
knowledge which is incompatible with both varieties. To the extent that this is right, it would count against 
proposals which identify understanding and knowledge-how with knowledge-that. See, for example, Carter and 
Pritchard (2015b) for a presentation of this kind of argument. 
15 In Gettier’s Smith/Jones case, the justification Smith has is for the proposition ‘The man who will get the job 
has 10 coins in his pocket’ is justification Smith has for the proposition that Jones will get the job and has 10 coins 
in his pocket’. But what makes the target proposition true has nothing to do with Jones whatsoever. It’s that Smith 
got the job and had 10 coins in his pocket. Note that this regained disconnect that typifies intervening luck should 
not be conflated with the more general phenomenon described by Zagzebski (1994) as ‘double luck’, which is 
general enough to subsume both intervening and environmental cases. After all, it is bad luck that protagonist in a 
barn facade case happens to be in an epistemically unhospitable environment but good luck that perception issues 
a true belief on the particular occasion that it does. But this does not mean that the source of the justification for 
the target proposition and what causes it to be true are disconnected in the way we find it to be in intervening luck 
cases. 
16 For an overview of how the intervening/environmental luck distinction has import for these debates, see for 
example [Carter and Pritchard (2015a); Carter and Pritchard (2015b);]. 
17 See, for example, Clark (2003) for a range of such cases. 
18 For a forthcoming volume of essays on the relationship between active externalist approaches in the philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science and mainstream epistemology, see Carter et al. (forthcoming). 
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